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I .  OVERVIEW
When Xanana Gusmão steps down as Timor-Leste’s prime minister, it will mark the beginning 
of a long-deferred transition of power from the closed circle of ageing leaders that has domi-
nated the country’s politics since the nationalist movement began.1 The timing remains unclear. 
Many are now sceptical he will resign in September as he said he would in late 2013, but it 
seems clear that he will leave office before the next election in 2017. His departure could signal 
a healthy move away from highly personalised governance to greater institutional development, 
particularly in the security sector. His successor will face the challenge of how to address poten-
tial sources of social and political unrest without Gusmão’s unparalleled authority.
In the twelve years since the country’s independence, all the threats to stability have been 
internal. Many have emerged from bitter feuds among members of Falintil, the guerrilla army 
that fought for independence, as well as jockeying by members of the former diaspora elite for 
influence after independence. Both have obstructed institutional development of the country’s 
security forces; together, they have sometimes led to violence. Both were important factors in a 
violent upheaval in 2006 that saw the state’s command of its security forces briefly collapse.   
Gusmão’s announced plan to step down was triggered by the return from self-imposed exile 
of a former guerrilla named Mauk Moruk, who in 1984 became the last man to directly challenge 
Gusmão’s authority (then as chief commander of Falintil). He immediately attempted some-
thing similar when he came back, gathering a few hundred followers, launching a “revolutionary 
council”, attacking Gusmão’s “authoritarian” leadership style and calling for the dissolution of 
parliament. While government leaders were concerned by his potential ability to spark broader 
unrest, they appeared to be even more rattled by his version of history, and it was in the course 
of a nationally televised five-hour lecture to refute it that Gusmão announced his retirement.
Mauk Moruk’s charges against Gusmão drew attention to the latter’s critical role in managing 
the security forces. To deal with residual tensions from the 2006 crisis, Gusmão in 2007 merged 
the defence and interior ministries into a single Ministry of Defence and Security and put him-
self in charge. In doing so he succeeded in tempering inter-service rivalries and restoring sta-
bility but at the cost of reinforcing the old Falintil chain of command rather than allowing the 
development of independent civilian control. His successor will have to guard against re-emer-
gence of police-army rivalry, handle demands of veterans for more benefits and confront the 
politically sensitive issue of how to retire still-serving Falintil fighters. Gusmão had the personal 
authority to keep these issues under control; his successor may have a harder time.  
The political path to Gusmão’s resignation has been opened by his rapprochement with his 
old rival, Mari Alkatiri, the country’s first prime minister, and greater cooperation between their 
respective parties, Timorese National Congress for Reconstruction (Congresso Nacional da Re-
construção Timorense, CNRT) and Fretilin. It is not clear whether the new warmth will last, but 
Alkatiri’s assurance that he will not seek to head the next government is probably a prerequisite 
of Gusmão’s stepping down. The question is how the succession will serve the cause of transition 
from the old guard of the resistance, the so-called 1975 Generation, to a younger leadership less 
mired in the past. A resignation later this year would yield little real change in the short term: 
Gusmão’s replacement would almost certainly come from within his own party, and none of 
the potential successors has the charisma or independent political base required to win a future 
election.
More lasting change will have to wait until the 2017 election, when many believe that Taur 
Matan Ruak, current president and former army chief (and the last to serve as Gusmão’s deputy 
1 This paper grew out of a presentation to the inaugural Timor-Leste Update at Australian National University on 28 November 
2013.
2   Timor-Leste After Xanana Gusmão ©2014 IPAC
in Falintil), is the most likely contender to become prime minister. The Falintil-government link 
would thus continue, but Ruak is a decade younger than Gusmão or Alkatiri and he has shown 
more interest in grooming a new generation to take over.
Gusmão’s successors will face major challenges. The first is dealing with potential trouble-
makers, including dissident veterans, gangs and martial arts groups and unemployed youth. The 
second is reducing the capture of resources by the elite that is producing corruption and grow-
ing income inequality that itself could become a source of unrest. The third is addressing old 
social and political cleavages that continue to fester. Finally, there is what to do about Gusmão 
himself. He could move quietly into retirement, or he could be given some form of institution-
alised role, either as a Minister Mentor, following the Singaporean model created for Lee Kuan 
Yew, or as part of a Council of Elders in which others like Alkatiri could also be included. That 
would only postpone the real transition of power than Timor so badly needs.
II .  THE LONG HISTORY OF ELITE POWER STRUGGLES
Timor-Leste’s independence in 2002 was born out of a 24-year struggle with the Indonesian 
military, but since then, all threats to its stability have been internal.2 The key to understanding 
them lies in the power relationships that developed during the Resistance.3 
The independence struggle was fought on three fronts: armed, clandestine and diplomatic. 
The latter two included large networks active outside of Timor, either in Indonesia, where stu-
dents and civil servants carried information in and out of Timor and worked with Indonesian 
pro-democracy movements to strengthen the cause, or outside the region, where members of 
the diaspora elite lobbied for international attention in New York, Lisbon, Maputo, Sydney, Lon-
don and elsewhere. The dispersed nature of these networks allowed many individuals to develop 
influence, but there were not enough high-ranking positions after independence to fit them all 
in, especially in a half-island country of just 1.1 million people.
At home, Falintil fighters developed highly personalised relationships with their armed sub-
ordinates and with members of the clandestine front, a result of the cell structure that required 
small closed networks and strict security. These relationships created enduring loyalties that, 
since independence, have sometimes run counter to efforts at institution building.
In the early years following independence, a weak security sector provided fertile ground for 
keeping alive poisonous old rifts. The most serious problem arose from the 2001 demobilisation 
of Falintil. Some 1,300 ex-combatants were enrolled in a basic reintegration program, while 650 
fighters personally selected by Gusmão were recruited into the first battalion of the new armed 
forces and have since received a regular salary and greater prestige.4 Meanwhile, the police force, 
2 Within a few years of independence, whatever cross-border threat existed disappeared as former militias (comprised of 
anti-independence Timorese who had fled to Indonesian West Timor in 1999) lost Indonesian support, and political and 
economic links between the two countries improved. A final border settlement has remained elusive, but there are only 
two disputed sections remaining, both along the border of Oecusse district, the enclave of Timor-Leste surrounded by the 
Indonesian province of Nusa Tenggara Timur. The difference in views on where the border lies has led to some tensions in 
Citrana, the westernmost point of Oecusse, where Timorese view periodic Indonesian military patrols as incursions. For 
more detail see International Crisis Group, “Timor-Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Border”, 20 May 2010.
3 The Resistance (A Resistência) refers to the struggle by pro-independence forces to resist Indonesian rule following the 7 
December 1975 military invasion. The most comprehensive history of the resistance, as well as the short preceding peri-
od that followed the 25 April 1974 revolution that overthrew the Portuguese Estado Novo regime, was produced by the 
Commission on Truth, Reception and Reconciliation (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação, CAVR) and is 
available at www.cavr-timorleste.org.
4 The Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP) provided each demobilised Falintil with $500 paid over five months 
as a transitional safety net and $500 of support through skills training projects. See “Defining Heroes: Key Lessons from 
the Creation of Veterans Policy in Timor-Leste”, World Bank, September 2008, and John McCarthy, “Falintil Reinsertion 
Assistance Program (FRAP) Final Evaluation Report”, International Organisation on Migration, June 2002.
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established in 2000 from a core of 800 Timorese who had formerly served with the Indonesian 
police, together with new recruits, struggled in the early years to earn public legitimacy. Those 
who had served the Indonesian government were often seen as complicit in its crimes, while the 
rest struggled to learn policing skills.5
It was from the demobilised guerrillas and others more loosely associated with the armed 
front (many claiming “veteran” status despite never having served) that many of Timor-Leste’s 
dissident groups were born. They generally share the following characteristics:   
• They draw on personal connections with former Falintil members largely in isolated rural 
communities;
• They have a parasitic relationship with these communities, collecting funds through petty 
extortion efforts and harassment, sometimes including raising membership fees or selling 
uniforms;
• They are protean in nature, tending to strengthen and weaken again over time and the 
divisions between different groups are often unclear, which makes managing them more 
complex; and
• They operate outside the political system, in part because they would likely fare poorly if 
they entered mainstream party politics.
The largest and most consistently active of these groups is the Popular Council for the De-
fence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL). Established before indepen-
dence, it has questioned the legitimacy of the state ever since, calling for cancellation of the 
2002 Constitution and the reconstitution of the security forces. Led by ex-Falintil fighter Ologari 
Assuwain, who joined Mauk Moruk in the 1984 leadership challenge, it is a mix of former Falin-
til dissidents and their followers. One of its primary founding patrons was Abílio Araújo, a man 
who had headed the Fretilin External Delegation in the 1980s from his Lisbon home but later 
switched sides and became one of the Soeharto government’s greatest supporters abroad. Since 
independence, he has been looking for a way back in to Timorese politics.6
When these groups have been mobilised to serve the interests of particular political masters, 
the results have been toxic, both for the development of the security sector and for stability gen-
erally. Rogério Lobato, the man who had been appointed “defence minister” following Fretilin’s 
1975 unilateral declaration of independence, in 2002 began mobilising various veterans’ groups 
onto the streets once it appeared clear he would be passed over for his old post by Alkatiri.7 Hav-
ing proven his capacity to create unrest, he was appointed interior minister, where he set about 
institutionalising factionalism through the creation of special units more loyal to him than to 
the state and informal security groups from outside the police.8
These brewing tensions came to a head in 2006, when competing factions of the country’s 
political elite exploited weak institutional command lines within the security services to deadly 
effect. It eventually led to the collapse of the police command and the death of 31 people, includ-
5 For more on the challenges of police reform and development, see International Crisis Group, “Handing Back Responsibil-
ity to Timor-Leste’s Police”, 3 December 2009.
6 Araújo’s bid for the presidency in 2012 attracted just 6,294 votes (1.4 per cent). His Partido Nacionalista Timor (Timor 
Nationalist Party) gained two seats in the 2001 elections but fell short of the threshold required for seats in the 2007 and 
2012 elections.
7 Lobato had served briefly as defence minister in the Fretilin administration appointed in 1975, but left the country days 
before the Indonesian invasion, along with Alkatiri and José Ramos-Horta. He spent most of the occupation in Angola and 
Mozambique.
8 One of these was the Forças de Base de Apoio (FBA), a group drawn in part from the informal auxiliary support services of 
the same name that had helped Falintil fighters in the jungle. It was led by Komandante Labarik Maia, who in 2013 joined 
Mauk Moruk’s “rebellion”. The FBA were emblematic of the confusionaround veterans’ policy in Timor-Leste: they are a 
“veterans’ group” whose membership is largely comprised of non-veterans. 
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ing eight police officers shot by their army colleagues. Some dissident groups were mobilised 
as a way of attacking the legitimacy of the army; the army responded by calling up and arming 
former Falintil members as a reserve force.
III .  MAUK MORUK: SPECTRE OF THE PAST
The 2013 attempt at “revolution” led by Mauk Moruk, the disgruntled Falintil commander, showed 
how old enmities among veterans remain a potential source of instability.This time, the elite suc-
cessfully closed ranks, and Mauk has been detained for a year awaiting trial and most of his support 
base dismantled, although police operations against his Revolutionary Maubere Council (Konsel-
ho Revolucionário Maubere, KRM) appear to still be continuing more than three months later. 
The threat has been largely silenced for now, but not entirely—a handful of KRM figures 
as of July 2014 were continuing to evade police capture after a joint police-army operation 
was launched, and Mauk Moruk may ultimately be pardoned.9 There may also be other Mauk 
Moruks in the future. Gusmão, as the former Falintil commander, remains the principal target 
of intra-elite challenges—by stepping down he may be able to protect the government from 
some of these attacks. One constructive role he could play after resigning would be to use his 
authority to keep tensions among the Falintil veterans in check. 
A. The Hudilaran Group, 1984
Mauk appeared to pose a threat to the Timorese leadership less for his ragtag followers than for 
his past history. Born Paulino Gama in Laga, Baucau district in 1955, he rose from relative ob-
scurity within Falintil ranks in 1981, when Gusmão launched a reorganisation of the resistance 
military structures after the disastrous losses sustained in the late 1970s.10 Gusmão became both 
political and military leader of the resistance; Paulino, who had adopted the nom de guerre of 
Mauk Moruk, meaning “bitter brother”, was named the Falintil deputy chief of staff.11
He remains best known for his role as a member of the Hudilaran Group, led by then chief of 
staff Kilik Wae Gae that launched a 1984 challenge to Gusmão’s leadership. Never before or since 
has there been such a direct confrontation. It appears to have grown out of opposition by Mauk, 
Kilik and others to a series of strategic decisions made by Gusmão in 1982-84. These included 
the decision to discard Marxist-Leninist ideology as the basis of the struggle and embrace in-
stead a strategy of national unity, as well as further restructuring of the military command.12 The 
available histories draw primarily on the testimony of Gusmão or those who remained loyal to 
him. According to one summary:
[W]hile ideological differences were cited [as the source of the dispute], the real issue was 
9 A visit by the first lady, Isabel da Costa Ferreira, to Mauk Moruk in prison on 24 March 2014 provoked speculation that, 
if convicted, Mauk would likely receive a pardon from her husband (pardons and sentence reductions in Timor-Leste are 
granted by the president on the proposal of the justice minister). In extended comments at an 11 November event, Ruak 
told of how he lived with Mauk’s older brother, Cornélio Gama, for two years during the war and called him “father” and 
“brother” (maun no aman), and that Mauk once helped save his life. But he also explained that while the personal bonds 
of the past are lasting, they cannot interfere with the institutional and command responsibilities of the present. “Stone is 
stone, and wood wood…you can’t confuse the two”. See video of the event posted as “Debate Xanana vs Mauk Moruk”, 14 
Nov 2013 at www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFV9iqrzvuI.
10 Mauk was the youngest of eighteen children, all but three of whom were killed in the early years of the Indonesian occupa-
tion, as were his wife and two children. One of his two surviving siblings was the former Falintil commander and member 
of parliament Cornélio Gama, discussed below.
11 Most members of the armed and clandestine fronts adopted noms de guerre or code names during the struggle. See Appen-
dix A for a list of those used in this report. 
12 The move to discard Marxist-Leninist ideology was important because it ultimately allowed the broader Resistance move-
ment to attract the support of both the Catholic Church and the Timorese Democratic Union (União Democrática 
Timorense, UDT). 
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one of discipline. Xanana realised the need to bring together all the efforts of those who 
wanted the independence of the homeland, without reference to party differences, while 
Kilik cited loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist [cause] to justify his lack of commitment to the 
Struggle, and obtained the support of some of the cadres.13
Mauk tells it differently, insisting that the Hudilaran Group was in fact pushing back against 
an increasingly authoritarian Gusmão.14 The strategic decisions Gusmão made during this peri-
od were instrumental in reshaping Falintil into a serious guerrilla force; they also dramatically 
consolidated power in his own hands. 
Whatever happened, Kilik and Mauk were demoted after the incident; Kilik died under mys-
terious circumstances not long after, while Mauk and Ologari surrendered to the Indonesians. 
Mauk ended up in the psychiatric ward of a Jakarta military hospital before fleeing to Portugal 
and eventually taking up residence in the Netherlands until his 2013 return.
B. The Konselho Revolucionário Maubere (KRM), 2014
Mauk’s role in the 1984 leadership challenge made it clear he was not afraid of confrontation. 
So, too, did the choice of allies he made upon his return. One was Komandante Labarik, one of 
those enlisted by Rogério Lobato when he was minister to organise informal security groups.15 
Another was Angela Freitas, a failed politician who became secretary-general of the KRM.16 He 
also re-established links with CPD-RDTL, the group headed by his former comrade, Ologari 
Assuwain. 
Mauk Moruk’s most dangerous potential ally, however, was his older brother, Cornélio Gama, 
the former Falintil commander known as L-7 (Elle Sette). He remained on the fringe of KRM’s 
activities, appearing sometimes at its press conferences and hosting the group at his home in 
Dili. Had he chosen to do so, L-7 could likely have mobilised a far greater number of supporters, 
including through his own Falintil connections, but also through a group he leads known as the 
Sagrada Família (Holy Family), a veterans group which was linked to many violent protests in 
the period directly following independence.
The KRM first began to attract national attention after a seminar it organised at the national 
university, across from Parliament House, on 21 October 2013. There, Mauk announced the 
KRM’s goals of dissolving parliament, cancelling the 2002 constitution and ushering in a period 
of interim government, which it would head.17
The government had initially ignored Mauk’s return but soon after the seminar, Gusmão 
began giving angry comments to the press saying Mauk was “distorting history” and asked Pres-
13  José Mattoso, A Dignidade: Konis Santana e a Resistência Timorense, Lisbon: 2005, p. 120.
14  See the undated letter, circulated in late October, from the KRM at povomauberetubaraimetin.blogspot.com.
15  See “Kelompok Mantan Pejuang: Apa Mau Mereka?”, Cidadaun No. 26, Yayasan HAK, July 2002.
16  Angela Freitas is the daughter of the founder of the Workers’ Party (Partido Trabalhista de Timor, PTT), the lesser known 
of the five parties established in 1974-75, the brief period of preparation for decolonisation that followed the fall of the 
Portuguese dictatorship and preceded the Indonesian invasion. Freitas reconstituted the party in 2001, but it attracted 
almost no support, receiving just 0.56 per cent of the vote in the 2001. After failing to qualify as a presidential candidate 
in 2012, she told the press she would not be able to control her disappointed supporters. Four days later, Molotov cocktails 
were thrown at the office of the elections commission. See “Rejected Presidential candidate predicts more violence in East 
Timor”, 20 February 2012. See also Alex Tilman, “Angela Freitas, first female candidate”, Di’ak ka Lae? (blog), 7 January 
2012, available at www.diakkalae.com/2012/01/angela-freitas-first-female-candidate.html. 
17 These demands were very similar to the line put forth by CPD-RDTL over the years: that the 2002 Constitution must be 
thrown out and the 1975 Constitution drafted by Fretilin reinstated, and that CPD-RDTL should take over governing the 
country. Under the 1975 Constitution, the government was placed under the control of the Falintil commander-in-chief 
(Article 4). See, for example, the letter from CPD-RDTL to PM Xanana Gusmão “Ba Governu ho Nian Chefe no 1o Ministru 
da RDTL Sr. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, hato’o aspirasaun popular no ezijensias ho baze iha prosesu de restaurasaun, lialos, 
direitu no justisa, liu husi asaun pasifika iha Dili”, dated 5 October 2011.
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ident Ruak to convene a public debate on the subject.18 Ruak cancelled a state visit to Japan at the 
last minute to do so, and on 11 November, top leaders and former members of the government, 
the army, the police and veterans gathered to hear Gusmão and Mauk debate Resistance history. 
Mauk, however, failed to show. Gusmão turned the publicly televised program into a five-
hour lecture on the origins of the state. He also used the occasion to announce his resignation. 
The extraordinary event suggested both that Gusmão took Mauk’s criticism deeply personally 
and that he believed that, if left unchallenged, it could have a significant destabilising effect.
In the months that followed, the KRM continued agitating largely from the home base of 
Mauk and L-7 in Laluvai, in the rural eastern part of Baucau district. Gusmão finally sought 
and obtained a parliamentary resolution condemning the KRM, CPD-RDTL and other “illegal 
groups” and calling for their arrest on five separate alleged violations of the law that ranged from 
the misuse of military uniforms to more serious crimes of appropriating the functions of the 
state and threatening the rule of law.19 The resolution drew objections from a number of civil 
society groups, who viewed the move as more of a political show of strength than any effort at 
law enforcement—why, they asked, hadn’t police and prosecutors acted earlier purely on the 
basis of the criminal code?20
On 13 March, a week after the resolution was adopted, police visited Mauk Moruk, Labarik 
and L-7 at the latter’s residence in Fatuhada, Dili. The three eventually agreed to enter police 
detention. L-7 told the press:
We could have burned down Dili if we liked but we don’t want to see the people suffer. For 
that reason I am turning myself in.21
All three were arraigned at a preliminary hearing on 15 March. L-7 was given a conditional 
release, while Mauk and Labarik were remanded in custody.22 In June 2013, the prosecutor in-
dicated that full investigation of the case would likely require a full year, the maximum period 
under which someone can be held in preventive detention.23 It is not clear how much evidence 
exists to link the three to the charges; the delays in the trial will only further fuel suspicion 
among some that the arrests were politically motivated.
At the same time that arrests were being made in Dili, the police launched a two-month 
operation targeting both KRM and CPD-RDTL members. In Covalima and Bobonaro, police 
peacefully dismantled CPD-RDTL offices and took members of the group into temporary cus-
tody. Operations in Laga, where KRM supporters were holed up with ex-Falintil arms, and Ba-
guia were less professional: Tempo Semanal newspaper posted online video of what looks like a 
chaotic exchange of fire between police and locals and indiscriminate burning of houses.24 One 
KRM member was said to have stabbed himself to death to resist arrest.25 The army was brought 
in to bolster the police operation and former Falintil serving in the army initially tried to per-
18 “PM Xanana, ‘Mauk Moruk Labele Distorsia Historia Hodi Lohi Povu’”, Jornal Nacional Diário, 29 October 2013.
19 In the original Portuguese, usurpação das funções and alteração do Estado de Direito, defined under Articles 195 and 202 of 
the Timor-Leste Penal Code. The latter carries sentences of up to fifteen years in prison.
20 See “Joint Civil Society Declaration on the Joint PNTL-F-FDTL Operation Implementing Parliamentary Resolution No. 
5/2014 and Council of Ministers Resolution No. 8/2014”, 22 April 2014.
21 See video posted by Tempo Semanal newspaper at www.youtube.com/watch?v=P4tcjFI2v4Q.
22 L-7 was released under termos de identidade residência (TIR), a limited form of house arrest that requires only monthly 
reports to the police and allows relatively free movement. The other two were placed in preventive custody (prisão preven-
tiva). Under the Criminal Procedure Code, suspects may remain in such custody for up to a year when the related charges 
carry a potential prison sentence of over three years. 
23 “Kazu Mauk Moruk Involve Ema Barak, MP Presiza Tinan Ida”, Jornal Nacional Diário, 3 June 2014.
24 Video is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=SaMOX0K3xoc.
25 Timorese security sector monitoring NGO Fundasaun Mahein published a report raising several concerns about these op-
erations, finding they had done little to improve security in the affected regions, detailing several cases of assault by police, 
and a widespread reluctance among community members to discuss what had happened because of police pressure. See 
“Operasaun Habelun: Reintegra ka Ameasa?”, Fundasaun Mahein, 26 June 2014.
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suade KRM members to surrender and hand over arms.26 
The whole episode showed how raw the old political wounds from the Resistance still were 
and how easily a small armed group could be mobilised. Even if Mauk Moruk could not deliver 
on serious revolt, he would undoubtedly have created more problems and might have broadened 
his support base if left alone. Disgruntled veterans are still susceptible to this kind of mobili-
sation, and Gusmão, because he embodies not only the government but also the old command 
structure, is both their most obvious target and the person best placed to defuse the threat.
IV. CHALLENGES FOR THE SECURITY SECTOR
Mauk Moruk’s charges against Gusmão, particularly about his penchant for concentrating pow-
er, alluded in part to the decision the latter had made in 2007 in the aftermath of the 2006 
violence, to merge the defence and interior ministries and put himself in charge. The creation 
of a unified Ministry of Defence and Security may have been a necessary stopgap measure to 
ease tensions within the security services and  restore stability to a badly shaken nation. It also 
showed, however, how dependent the country was on Gusmão’s personal authority as former 
Falintil commander-in-chief. Seven years later, it is time to separate the head of government 
from the former guerrilla command and allow the emergence of independent civilian control 
of the armed forces. The appointment of an independent defence minister, drawn from outside 
the ranks of Falintil veterans, would be an important step towards reducing the latter’s influence 
and creating a force responsive to the country’s strategic needs. It is also urgent that a new police 
commissioner be appointed, chosen for professionalism rather than personal loyalties.
A. The Police 
The leadership of the police force has not been fully resolved since the command collapsed 
during the 2006 crisis. In April 2009, Longuinhos Monteiro, the then prosecutor-general, was 
appointed police commissioner to oversee a two-year transitional period aimed at strengthen-
ing the chain of command in the police, including through implementation of a new policing 
law that focused on a new, performance-based rank structure, better discipline, improved man-
agement and higher pay.27 Monteiro, widely seen as a Gusmão loyalist, had few enemies within 
the force, but as an outsider, he was nevertheless not a particularly popular choice. In 2011, his 
term was extended for two years because a number of key reforms were not yet complete. In 
2013, Gusmão extended his term again, largely because no one from within the institution was 
seen as a credible replacement. A number of candidates with the requisite rank exist, but none 
has the authority to prevent the re-emergence of factional tensions that first became apparent 
during Lobato’s tenure as minister.  
The reforms that began in 2009 have improved police professionalism but problems remain, 
including poor accountability, weak investigations, over-reliance on large-scale special opera-
tions (generally featuring military back-up), and weak crowd and riot control capacity. Without 
a leader with broader internal credibility, and a competent interior minister able to set a clear-
er vision for future reform, there is unlikely to be much progress. The two-month operation 
against the KRM offered evidence of these shortcomings: it looks unlikely to produce many 
criminal prosecutions but did trigger a number of complaints of politically motivated targeting, 
an uncontrolled shoot-out and house burnings (allegedly by police) in Lalulai, the KRM’s base.28 
26  Video is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tA94Ul3peg.
27  Decree-Law 9/2009, “Lei Orgânica da Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL)”, 18 February 2009.
28 “Populasaun Lalulai Hahú Kore-an Husi Trauma”, Tempo Semanal, 27 March 2014; “Militantes Fretilin Sai Vítima Opera-
saun Konjunta”, Tempo Semanal Online, 30 May 2014.
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These suggest there is still serious need for improvement.
B. The Army
The army looks in better shape, having already experienced a transfer of command in October 
2011 when Taur Matan Ruak resigned to become president. Ruak handed over command to his 
deputy, Lere Annan Timor. Lere is widely seen as temperamental and as a strong Fretilin sup-
porter, he has not always been viewed as politically impartial. But he is assisted in the job by two 
well respected subordinates, Filomeno Paixão, his deputy, who is seen as having improved the 
military’s administration, and Falur Rate Laek, the chief of staff.29 
Three fundamental challenges that have been deferred under Gusmão will need to be tackled 
soon. The first is establishing independent civilian control over defence policy. This can only 
happen with a defence minister drawn from outside Falintil. In August 2012, Gusmão proposed 
Maria Domingas Alves, the former Minister of Social Solidarity, as Minister of Defence and Se-
curity. She had developed a strong reputation for management but had little expertise in security 
matters. Ruak rejected the nomination. A second nominee, the head of the intelligence services, 
was officially approved as minister but never inaugurated; he apparently declined to take up the 
post believing he did not have Gusmão’s genuine support.30 Finding a suitable replacement will 
be more difficult after Gusmão has stepped down because the army leadership may be less con-
fident that their interests are going to be represented.
The second challenge will be retiring the ageing contingent of ex-Falintil forces still serving 
in the military.31 The impact of this transition will be more political than operational. In 2001, 
the army’s first battalion was formed from 650 of the remaining Falintil veterans. Many of them 
are now older than 55, the statutory age of retirement; rates of absenteeism are understood to 
be high. Political sensitivities have been more important than procedural questions in delaying 
their retirement.32 Because their retirement will be an important step towards severance of the 
link between Falintil and the state, it is likely to fuel further demands for greater rewards and 
influence from not just the veterans but also those who have staked their political legitimacy 
around their ties to veterans. This is another reason why having Gusmão remain in charge of a 
forum like the veterans’ council could be a key tool for managing tensions.
The third is finding a role for an army expanding in size that still has few effective operational 
duties besides providing backup to the police. Given how much influence the former guerrilla 
army holds in government, it is striking that it has been so restrained in its ambitions. While 
a 2007 white paper known as “Força 2020” set ambitious goals including the development of 
an air force capability, the army has largely focused on the more fundamental work of slowly 
rebuilding its ranks in the wake of the 2006 crisis from a post-crisis low of under 1,000 to an 
expected force strength of 2,342 by the end of this year.33 Defence spending remains relatively 
29 Following Ruak’s resignation and Paixão’s promotion to Brigadier General and deputy commander, some groups raised 
questions over Paixão’s in 1979 to give up arms and leave Falintil to return to civilian life. They suggested promoting instead 
Falur, who continued serving with Falintil and rose to become military commander of Region 3, the area covering Dili and 
the central mountains, in the late 1990s. The issue initially appeared to create tension between the two officers, but relations 
have apparently since improved. 
30 IPAC interview, Dili, 16 March 2014.
31 The 2014 state budget listed as one of the priorities of the Ministry of Defence and Security as “helping veterans retire with 
the dignity they deserve” and sets a goal of establishing specific values for allowances and grants, using those already pro-
vided to retired Falintil veterans as a guide.
32 Procedurally, their retirement was held up pending the establishment of a military service statute on retirement and pen-
sions, which has only been in place since 2013. “Julio Tomas Pinto: ‘Governu Aprova Ona Estatutu Militar’”, Jornal Nacional 
Diário, 30 December 2013.
33 This figure incorporates 500 new soldiers due to be recruited this year. Official figure cited in the 2014 State Budget, “Orça-
mento Geral do Estado 2014, Planos de Acção Annual, Livro 2”, October 2013, available at www.laohamutuk.org/econ/
OGE14/Prop/OGE14Bk2Oct2013pt.pdf.
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modest at $21.04 million, and lags considerably behind police spending ($27.5 million).34
V. NEW CONFIGURATIONS OF POLITICAL POWER 
The political path to transition has already been opened by a rapprochement in early 2013 between 
Gusmão and his old foe Mari Alkatiri.35 In February 2013, the two men—whose parties together 
control 55 of 65 seats in parliament—announced what they called “a new political arrangement”, 
in which Fretilin, the sole party in opposition, would play a constructive role on issues of na-
tional interest in exchange for a greater role in decision-making.36 It is likely that the move also 
involved a consensus on stepping back from leading political roles. It is impossible to imagine 
Gusmão stepping down if he believed Alkatiri would make another bid for leadership in 2017. 
If both men step down, a real transfer of political power from the old guard known as the 
“1975 Generation” to a younger generation is possible. But it will likely involve a managed tran-
sition, first to a Gusmão protégé to serve out his remaining term and then to a consensus candi-
date that many believe will be Taur Matan Ruak.   
A. The Old Guard
The name “1975 Generation”—shorthand for the elite that has thus far dominated Timorese 
politics—refers to those who had already established themselves in political life during the short 
period of decolonisation that followed the April 1974 fall of the Portuguese dictatorship and 
preceded the December 1975 invasion by Indonesian forces.37
Gusmão, who is now 68, and Marí Alkatiri, 64, are its foremost representatives. After serving 
as president for five years (2002-2007), Gusmão set up  CNRT as a vehicle for replacing Alkatiri 
as prime minister.38 It is a presidentialist party—established and held together largely as a vehi-
cle for Gusmão—in a parliamentary system. Alkatiri returned in 1999 from exile in Angola and 
Mozambique, became secretary-general of the Fretilin party he had helped found in 1975 and 
served as the first prime minister from May 2002 until June 2006, when he was forced to step 
down in the wake of the 2006 crisis. Alkatiri is secretary-general of the party while Francisco 
“Lu Olo” Guterres, a former Falintil commander who served largely in non-combat roles, is the 
party president.39
Two others from this group have been largely marginalised in recent years, particularly fol-
lowing disappointing showings in the 2012 elections.
• José Ramos-Horta, 64, has remained largely independent of party affiliation after spend-
34 Ibid. 
35 The rivalry goes back years but became particularly intense during the years in which Alkatiri was prime minister, Gusmão 
president (2002-2006). One observer described it as “a very uncomfortable cohabitation between a politically opposed 
Prime Minister and President…[as] then President Gusmão used both his moral authority and his formal powers to stymie 
key policies of the Alkitiri government”. Sue Ingram, “Will Timor’s development challenges push a close political marriage 
down the path of executive cohabitation?”, Devpolicy blog, 5 September 2012, available at devpolicy.org/will-timors-devel-
opment-challenges-push-a-close-political-marriage-down-the-path-of-executive-cohabitation/. Fretilin, under Alkatiri, 
never fully recognised the legitimacy of the first Gusmão government elected in 2007, believing that, as the party with the 
most seats after the 2007 elections, Fretilin should have been invited to form the government.
36 “Xanana informa konjuntura politika foun ba TMR”, Suara Timor Lorosae, 21 February 2013.
37 Gusmão used part of his 11 November 2013 address to tell in detail the history of his own involvement with Fretilin and 
with the Resistance more broadly, as a rebuke to claims by Mauk Moruk and others that they were authorised to tell the 
“real” history of Fretilin. Video is available online at www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFV9iqzrvuI.
38 The party’s name recalls the umbrella body that Gusmão founded in 1987 (first called the CNRM, renamed CNRT a year 
later) after separating the Falintil command from the Fretilin leadership, of which Alkatiri was then a key member. The 
decision was one source of the former acrimony between the two men.
39 A Fretilin party biography of Lu Olo is available at fretilinmedia.blogspot.com/2012/02/francisco-guterres-lu-olo-free-
dom.html.
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ing the occupation period campaigning for Timorese independence abroad. He served as 
foreign minister in the first government, as interim prime minister in 2006-2007 following 
Alkatiri’s resignation,  and then as president from 2007 to 2012. He ran again for the pres-
idency in 2012 but came third, with 17 per cent of the vote. He left Dili in January 2013 to 
take over as chief of the United Nations mission in Guinea-Bissau.
• Mário Carrascalão, 77, helped found and led the Social Democrat Party (PSD) and most 
recently served as vice-prime minister tasked with oversight of corruption issues from 
2009 to 2010 before a messy resignation.40 He was governor of Indonesian East Timor 
from 1983 until 1992, but later joined the pro-independence movement in 1998. PSD’s 
share of the vote in 2012 fell to just 2 per cent.
Discussion of how and when a transition of political power will take place has never been 
cast as a decision for voters. Instead, it has been framed as an issue for the older generation to 
determine the “readiness” of their juniors.
That determination has not been forthcoming, as none has shown much interest in handing 
over power. A process known as the Maubisse Forum that began in 2010 with the sponsorship 
of the Catholic Church was nominally aimed at discussing the preparation of younger leaders 
in advance of the 2012 elections. Gusmão, Alkatiri, Lu Olo, Ramos-Horta and Carrascalão all 
attended; so did Taur Matan Ruak. It produced few results; an expanded meeting the following 
year (Maubisse II) pledged only to work towards a peaceful election, with Gusmão suggesting 
that the younger generation still lacked the authority to lead.41
Political parties have not proven effective avenues for the advancement of younger leaders. 
Fretilin is widely considered to have the broadest cast of younger, charismatic leaders, many of 
whom have their own support bases and experience serving as ministers in the first government. 
But despite their lobbying, there has been little serious discussion of leadership change at party 
level—a 2011 internal leadership vote was contested only by the incumbents. CNRT has few 
obvious potential successors as party chief; the party has staked its electoral appeal so much on 
the figure of Gusmão himself, and has drawn support from such a disparate range of groups that 
there are real questions about whether it will survive Gusmão’s resignation.
Where younger politicians have risen to important positions, they have struggled to obtain 
real influence. The Democratic Party (Partido Democrático, PD) was formed in 2001 in large 
part to meet the political aspirations of former student activists.42 Since 2007, the party has tried 
to get its leader, Fernando “Lasama” de Araújo, elected as either president or prime minister, 
but it has been weakened by internal leadership disputes.43 After Lasama’s failure to make it into 
the second round of presidential polls in April 2012, the party nearly fell apart: his own camp 
favoured an alliance with Fretilin and supported Lu Olo in the second round, while others, led 
by party secretary-general Mariano Sabino, defended an alliance with CNRT. After the election, 
PD entered into coalition with CNRT, and Lasama was appointed vice-prime minister. The role 
has turned out to be largely ceremonial.
40 Carrascalão was appointed vice-prime minister for administrative and management affairs, with a particular focus on 
handling perceived corruption within the government. He resigned in September 2010 after Gusmão reportedly called him 
both “stupid” (beikteen) and a “liar” (bosokteen). See “Surat Rezigna An: Husi Mario”, Tempo Semanal online, 9 September 
2010.
41 In his 11 November 2013 lecture, Gusmão said: “Everyone will remember that we from the older generation sought to chal-
lenge (provoka) the younger generation in Lahane at the Maubisse II meeting to [see what they were made of], And some of 
them said to me:  ‘we showed you but you said we still don’t have the authority [to lead].’ I ask you: get to work. Work hard. 
Give it your best.” See video at www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFV9iqzrvuI.
42 PD’s founders were drawn largely from the ranks of Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste (National Resis-
tance of Timor-Leste Students, Renetil) founded in June 1988. 
43 Lasama received roughly the same share of votes in the two presidential races he has contested: 77,459 or 19 per cent in 
2007, and 80,381 or 17 per cent in 2012.
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B. The Next Government 
If Gusmão resigns before the 2017 elections, he will choose his own successor. There is no dis-
cussion of calling new elections. Under the constitution, the president appoints a person select-
ed by the parties with representation in parliament.44 Fretilin—the only other party that could 
form a coalition government—has made clear that it will not seek to challenge CNRT’s “prerog-
ative”, as the party with the most seats.45
This means an interim prime minister is almost certain to come from within CNRT. There 
are three leading figures within the party, none of whom has a strong political base independent 
of Gusmão: 
• Agio Pereira, the current Minister of State and long-time trusted adviser of Gusmão. 
Widely considered the front runner, he served as chief of staff throughout Gusmão’s presi-
dency and was a secretary of state and government spokesman from 2007 to 2012. Pereira 
is widely seen as the chief manager within the current government. It is to him (and not 
the vice-prime minister) that Gusmão has temporarily officially delegated his duties, for 
example during the 2012 election campaign. Pereira spent the resistance in Australia.
• Dionísio Babo Soares,  the current Minister of Justice and secretary-general of the par-
ty. He holds a Ph.D in anthropology from Australian National University, served on 
the Supreme Council of the Judiciary and co-chaired the Timor-Leste-Indonesia bilateral 
Commission on Truth and Friendship. He also spent much of the resistance period out-
side the country.
• Bendito Freitas, the current Minister of Education. In the last government, he served as 
Secretary of State for Professional Training and Employment.
There remains an outside chance that CNRT could choose to put forward a candidate from 
outside the party if it were to go into coalition with Fretilin, discussed below. The three figures 
most frequently cited in this regard are: 
• Rui de Araújo, member of the Fretilin central committee and former Minister of Health in 
the first post-independence government. Widely viewed as an effective minister, he gener-
ates more popular buzz than any of the other contenders. His strong Fretilin background 
will limit his popularity outside the party, but his selection would offer more proof of a real 
change in relations between CNRT and Fretilin and indicate that the cooperation between 
themcould last.
• Fernando “Lasama” de Araújo is the current vice-prime minister and president of the 
Democrat Party (Partido Democrático, PD). In the 1990s he headed the influential stu-
dent movement, Renetil. PD’s internal divisions diminish Lasama’s chances, which were 
never high. He is the one candidate with his own political base, in the central highlands 
among the ethnic Mambae
• Estanislau da Silva, Fretilin party MP. Da Silva served as agriculture minister in the first 
Fretilin government from 2002-2007 and served briefly as prime minister in 2007 after 
then-Prime Minister Ramos-Horta left office to serve as president.
None of these potential replacements—with the possible exception of Rui Araújo—would 
herald a real political transition because they do not wield authority independent of Gusmão 
44 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Article 106. The Consitution foresees the dismissal of the govern-
ment in circumstances that include the resignation of the prime minister but does not establish any special procedures for 
new government formation. All draft legislation lapses with the dismissal of the Government (Article 97).
45 “Fretilin Respeita CNRT, Sei La Artikula Ba Governu”, Tempo Semanal online, 27 March 2014.
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and are thus unlikely to be re-elected. 
Prospects for more lasting change exist following new elections in 2017. Taur Matan Ruak, 
now president, is the leading contender, although not everyone is convinced he will run. Ruak, 
who is from Baguia in eastern Baucau subdistrict, was the last Falintil senior commander from 
1998 to 2001.46 He then served as Timor-Leste’s first armed forces chief from 2001 until his resig-
nation in September 2011 to run for the presidency. He originally struggled to win over voters in 
the west, but in the second round of the election, he beat Lu Olo in every district except Baucau 
and Viqueque, winning 61 per cent of the overall vote.47
Many of Ruak’s supporters saw his transition from the military to the presidency as a natural 
step toward becoming prime minister. His popularity has likely increased since the election. 
He has made extensive trips to rural communities across the country, promising to act on their 
concerns in the capital, and positioned himself as the leading constructive critic of government. 
He has also invested in a core staff of younger advisers who have breathed some new life into the 
once stuffy presidential staff, indicating he may be more interested in developing future leaders 
than many of his older counterparts.   
If he runs in 2017, Ruak will have to either join an existing party or create his own to enter 
government. One option would be for him to join CNRT, where he would likely be welcome 
given that there is no one else strong enough to lead it into an election without Gusmão. He is 
far less likely to join Fretilin, but he has generally maintained good relations with the party. 
If he establishes a new party, it is likely to draw a considerable number of voters away from 
existing parties, particularly CNRT (if this happens, the party is unlikely to survive Gusmão’s 
retirement). In any case, he is likely to continue to both attract young voters and promote young-
er people for party and legislative positions.  
VI. CHALLENGES FOR A SUCCESSOR
Gusmão’s successor will face an array of potential security problems from challenges by armed 
groups to economic discontent to a possible deepening of old social and political cleavages. 
None will be new; the difference is that Gusmão will not be in a position to address them. It 
raises the question of what his post-prime minister role will or should be.
A. Potential Security Problems 
The main security threats will still be internal. The dissident ex-Falintil members and aggrieved 
veterans have not gone away. Some veterans of the resistance (a broadly defined constituency) 
believe they are entitled to a nearly endless stream of benefits, including state pensions, schol-
arships for their children, preferential access to state contracts, health care abroad and more. It 
will be in the interest of future governments to decrease these benefits that may have peaked in 
2012 at $109.7 million (or 9 per cent of actual annual state expenditures) but remain a heavy 
burden on the state.48 Ruak has become an outspoken critic of the veterans’ sense of entitlement 
and of the poor execution of many small infrastructure projects that they have won through 
46 He held important command roles in the country’s east throughout the 1970’s and 80’s before rising to the post of Chief of 
Staff in 1992 following Gusmão’s arrest. In 1998, after the death of Nino Konis Santana, Ruak became deputy command-
er-in-chief of Falintil forces (Gusmão remained commander from Cipinang prison in Jakarta).
47 Ruak faced opposition in the west in part for the role that he played during the 2006 crisis, initially by firing the nearly 600 
“petitioners” (who hailed almost exclusively from the west) as well as his alleged role in arming Falintil veterans. Election 
results are archived at staetl.com/wp/eleicoes/2012-2/rezultadu-provizorio-eleisaun-prezidensial-2012-segundo-volta. In 
Lautém district, Ruak won by just 215 of 26,895 votes. 
48 The 2014 budget set aside $85.2 million, or four times the amount budgeted for military spending.
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preferential treatment in securing government contracts.49 Limiting the benefits provided to 
them, though, will be politically difficult and could cause the kind of mini-rebellion that Mauk 
Moruk tried to provoke.50  
A younger generation of spoilers that came to prominence in the 2006 crisis may play a 
bigger role in the future.51 It includes a diverse range of army deserters, martial arts groups and 
gangs, many of whose members had either joined or cooperated with Falintil, in roles such as 
estafeta (messenger) during the last years of the resistance. They have few political objectives of 
their own but can be mobilised to support the interests of others.52 Gusmão’s response to the cri-
sis, which saw figures who had played leading roles in the crisis awarded lucrative government 
contracts, has also arguably established a perverse incentive for causing future trouble.53
Timor-Leste’s unemployed youth could also be a source of unrest, particularly in a country 
where nearly 70 per cent of the population is under 30, have limited engagement with the political 
system established by their elders and see a small elite benefiting from government contracts 
and public expenditures projects.54 Over 90 per cent of the country’s revenue is built on oil and 
gas receipts; a Petroleum Fund established to maximise these earnings has grown to over $16 
billion.55 The elite that decides how to spend this wealth is small: the finance minister and the 
natural resources minister are siblings, for example. Wealth distribution remains markedly 
uneven, particularly between rural areas and Dili, and is likely growing worse, given that so 
much of government spending, which makes up the bulk of the non-oil economy, is centred in 
the capital.56
Several old political cleavages that Gusmão succeeded in papering over could re-emerge. The 
most important is the old division between former supporters of integration and independence. 
A significant portion of Gusmão’s first and second cabinets were drawn from those who in 1999 
had supported continued integration with Indonesia, a strategy that both promoted reconcili-
ation with Indonesia and helped sponsor a boom in investment and construction activities by 
Indonesian firms. Some Timorese, however, resent that those who once opposed independence 
are now reaping its benefits. This sentiment is particularly pronounced among members of the 
army.
A second is the favoured position of Portuguese-Timorese mestiços. A significant portion of 
Timor-Leste’s small political elite is of mixed descent, many born from Portuguese deportados 
sent to its farthest colonial outpost as punishment. Many took part in the Resistance from their 
exile abroad. No party has publicly tried to mobilise support around the issue, but many admit 
that quiet resentment over the issue exist and that it could grow in the future, particularly if it 
49 “PR Taur: Emprejariu Hatama Osan Ba Bolsu, Projetu Barak Laiha Kualidade”, Suara Timor Lorosa’e, 23 April 2014.
50 Lia Kent and Joanne Wallis, “Timor-Leste’s Veterans Pension Scheme: Who are the Beneficiaries and Who is Missing Out?”, 
ANU SSGM In Brief 2014/13, 2014.
51 For more on this younger generation of gang leaders, see James Scambary / Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Mem-
orandum on Gangs and Youth Groups”, 18 December 2006.
52 One such figure is Lito Rambo, who after being arrested by the Indonesians in 1995 in Lospalos, escaped to the jungle and 
took up with Falintil. By 2006 he had become a gang leader with links to the military, and during the crisis he became in-
volved in a shoot-out with rival gang that killed four. Other figures joined the opposing side, such as Alfredo Reinado, the 
young military police commander who was said to have worked with the resistance after serving as an Indonesian military 
porter as a teenager. Reinado deserted at the height of the 2006 crisis and took up arms against the state for nearly two years 
before being shot dead on 11 February 2008, allegedly after masterminding the attack on President Ramos-Horta.
53 For more on this strategy, see International Crisis Group, “Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost?”, 8 May 2013.
54 Figures taken from National Statistics Directorate, Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, “Timor-Leste Demographic and 
Health Survey, 2009-2010”, op. cit., p.11.
55 2012 figures published in International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation: Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste”, 7 October 2013.
56 91 per cent of Dili’s population is in the top two quintiles of household earnings, while 50 per cent of the rural population is 
in the bottom two quintiles, according to 2010 figures. See Ministry of Finance National Statistics Directorate, “Timor-Leste 
Health and Demographic Survey 2009-2010”, December 2010, p. 28.
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becomes a proxy for resentment along class lines. 
Some political actors tried to rally support along regional and ethnic lines in the past—the 
east-west divide was a prominent factor in the 2006 crisis; it is almost never publicly mentioned 
these days.
Ruak is one member of the elite who has invested time in reaching out to different commu-
nities since becoming president and if elected prime minister, he would probably have an easier 
time than others bridging these divides. 
B. Is the Old Guard Still Needed?
Given these possible threats, the question is whether Gusmão’s authority needs to be institu-
tionalised in some formal role after he leaves office, given the current weakness of political 
institutions. There are three possibilities: head of a Veterans Council; a Singapore-style Minister 
Mentor; and an advisory Council of Elders that would include others of the 1975 Generation.
The Veterans Council was authorised by a 2006 law but has not yet been established. This is 
the role that Gusmão publicly envisioned for himself in 2000, before he ran for president, and 
many still view him as a natural choice to lead it, though the law currently stipulates that the 
chief must have no party connection. There is little agreement about what the council should 
actually do—some see it largely as a pressure group for influencing government policy and 
extracting more money and access to contracts from the state. If Gusmão could use the council 
as a forum for managing and reconciling tensions among veterans, it could prove useful. But 
making Gusmão head would only work if a strong civilian was appointed to the Ministry of 
Defence and Security, so that his appointment did not run counter the goal of breaking the link 
between Falintil and the government.  
Another option is for Gusmão to assume the role of minister mentor, following the model 
of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who stepped down in 1990 but continued to play 
a senior role in government for 21 years. The idea has some currency among younger leaders: 
PD president Lasama explicitly campaigned on the issue in 2012, saying that a PD government 
would appoint Gusmão as a senior minister.57 It is difficult to see the advantages of Gusmão 
taking on such a role. It could undermine the authority of a new prime minister and delay the 
needed transition to a new generation. Delegating authority is not Gusmão’s strength, and he 
has been criticized for micro-managing in certain areas even as he ignores others; he would 
likely not stand on the sidelines.
Finally, some have proposed the creation of an advisory council of former leaders. In public 
discussions, this has sometimes been called the Conselho das Katuas (Council of [Male] Elders) 
or the Grupo Velho.58 Ramos-Horta told the press in December 2013 that he would return from 
his UN post in Guinea-Bissau to join Gusmão, Alkatiri, Lu Olo, Carrascalao and Lere in “con-
ducting supervision and monitoring of the behaviour of the new generation of leaders [jerasaun 
foun] in order to safeguard the national interest”.59 The old guard has had trouble in the past 
agreeing on what the national interest actually is; it is difficult to imagine them speaking with 
one voice. 
57 “‘Mai Ita Hamutuk!’, Xanana PM Senior”, Timor Post, 25 June 2012.
58 Katuas is the Tetum honorific for a male elder.
59 “Horta: Xanana sai atu foo responsabilidade ba foinsa’e ho remodela V Governu”, Tempo Semanal online, 31 December 
2013.
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VII. CONCLUSION
One way or another, the illustrious political career of Xanana Gusmão is drawing to a close. If he 
does not step down as announced at the end of the year, at the very least it looks clear that he will 
not run again in 2017. He is one of the few guerrilla leaders who made a successful transition 
to political leader, and he has been a huge force for stability. Now the reins need to be passed 
to a new generation. It will not be easy for the country’s weak institutions to adapt to a less 
personalised system of governance but they will never have the opportunity to develop as long 
as it remains in place.
The security challenges are daunting and professionalisation of the security forces remains a 
work in progress—and needs to be a top priority of a successor. But Gusmão’s departure, when-
ever it takes place, and the replacement of the 1975 Generation by younger cadres, should help 
expand the political elite and make the country less prone to political problems rooted in the 
feuds and rivalries of the distant past.
The consensus between Gusmão and Marí Alkatiri, if it lasts, is a prerequisite for a workable 
transition. But it should not come at the expense of open competition between and within the 
parties, the one process most likely to produce a new crop of leaders. The end goal should be a 
political system that accommodates many voices, grants no special favours to particular groups, 
including veterans, and does a better job of distributing benefits beyond Dili. 
Perhaps the most statesmanlike act that Gusmão and his foe-turned-friend Alkatiri could 
undertake would be to return quietly to private life and let younger men and women take over.
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Appendix A: Noms de Guerre
Elle Sette   Cornélio Gama (also known as Eli Foho Rai Bo’ot)
Falur Rate Laek  Domingos Raul
Lasama   Fernando de Araújo
Lere Anan Timor  Tito da Costa Cristovão
Lu Olo   Francisco Guterres
Mauk Moruk  Paulino Gama
Taur Matan Ruak  José Maria dos Vasconcelos
Xanana Gusmão  José Alexandre “Kay Rala” Gusmão
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